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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Yeshiva University owned a commercial building located
at 55 Fifth Avenue in New York City.1 When a long-term tenant of that
building, American Book Company, decided to move its business to a
larger site, the company sought to sublet its rented space.2 Within a few
months of its decision to relocate, American Book Company found a
willing sublessor, Planned Parenthood.3 So American Book Company
contacted the managing agent of the building, Yeshiva University,
requesting its consent for the sublease.4 In November 1968, the
University denied consent because it held religious objections to the
activities of Planned Parenthood.5 Soon after, American Book Company
filed suit in the New York State Supreme Court.6
Claiming that irreparable harm would result if it could not complete
its sublease agreement, American Book Company sought an injunction.7
The company argued that the grounds upon which Yeshiva University
was withholding approval were indisputably unreasonable, and
therefore, the court ought to compel the University to give consent.8 In
a decision that has since become a staple of many Property Law courses,
the court agreed with American Book Company.9 The judge reasoned,
“when a religious or religiously affiliated . . . institution operates a
commercial enterprise or owns commercial property, it is to be held to
the established standards of commercial responsibility, its acts and
conduct being vested with no greater and no lesser sanctity than those of
any other owner.”10 Therefore, the doctrinal differences between
Yeshiva University and Planned Parenthood were simply irrelevant.11 It
did not matter that Yeshiva University held an objection to the activities
of Planned Parenthood because the “argument that there is a

1.
1969).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158, 160.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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fundamental conflict in the outlook of these two groups with respect to
the need and practice of birth control is a matter of theological
disputation in which courts should not be immersed.”12
The principle expressed in this decision is clear. Yeshiva
University, as a Jewish organization, set out to operate a commercial
enterprise.13 It leased space, in a commercial building, to a commercial
tenant.14 In so doing, the University subjected itself to the laws that
govern all similar commercial relationships.15 As landlord, it could not
withhold consent for a sublease for any subjective reason,16 and its
objections to Planned Parenthood were completely and wholly
American Book Company prevailed, and Planned
subjective.17
Parenthood was allowed to sublet the space.18
The principle that once a religious organization enters the realm of
commercial activity it is bound by the laws and customs that govern that
activity has again come to the forefront of the legal field. After the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),19 a
number of regulations were promulgated to give the Act effect.20 One
such regulation, which deals with women’s preventive healthcare, 21 has
since become the source of great conflict. Taken together with other

12.
13.
14.

Id. at 162.
Id.
The court noted that there is a distinction between this situation and one in
which a religious institution uses the property for religious purposes. “Differences of
creed may be taken into account when the property is owned by a religious institution
and is used ‘for religious purposes.’ With this exception, there can be no quarrel.” Id.
15. Id.
16. The court asserted this point based upon a clause in the lease stating that
“landlord’s consent was not to be ‘unreasonably withheld[,]’” as well as the court’s
assessment that “the purported reasons for refusal of consent by a landlord fall into two
broad categories—objective and subjective,” and “there is nothing inherent in the
identity of [Planned Parenthood] which would render it manifestly objectionable by any
. . . objective standards.” Id. at 159–60.
17. Id. at 160–61 (“The objection arises, therefore, because of who the landlord is.
Can the reasonableness of refusing consent vary with the identity and activities of the
landlord? If so, we are relegated . . . to wholly subjective criteria which render
effective judicial review difficult, if not impossible.”).
18. Id. at 163.
19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2), (3) (2012) (demonstrating that regulations are
needed to define the specifics of what constitutes acceptable coverage).
21. Coverage of Preventative Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2012).
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portions of the ACA, the regulation provides that in the near future,22 all
“large employers”23 will be required to provide their employees with a
healthcare plan that conforms to requirements set out by the ACA,24
which includes women’s preventive care, as defined by the Health
Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).25 Among other
categories of women’s preventive care that must be covered,26
employers will have to provide coverage for contraceptives.27
For many devout individuals, this mandate, which contains only a
narrow range of exempted religious employers, 28 presents a serious
dilemma. On one hand, the ACA imposes crippling fines for any
employers who fail to comply with the Act.29 On the other hand, the
principles of certain religions unequivocally state that using
contraceptives is a sin.30 Therefore, abiding by this law would be
tantamount to forfeiting observance of certain individuals’ religious
ideology.31
Many employers have filed lawsuits. Organizations ranging from
religiously affiliated educational institutions and hospitals, to Catholic
22. The precise date on which the regulation will affect different categories of
employers is somewhat unclear, because there have been a number of extensions and
grandfathering regulations passed in order to “gradually implemen[t]” the ACA
requirements. For a brief explanation of these “grandfathering rule[s],” see Legatus v.
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, at 993–94 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
23. A “large employer” is one that “with respect to a calendar year . . . employed
an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year.” 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012).
24. Id. § 4980H(a).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
26. See INST. OF MED., COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, CLINICAL
PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 80 (2011) [hereinafter IOM
REPORT] (recommending that screening for gestational diabetes, osteoporosis,
depression, breast cancer, counseling for misuse of alcohol, and several other categories
of preventive care be covered by the mandate).
27. 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 (2013).
28. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.30(a)(1)(iv) (2012).
29. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a).
30. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/health/religious-groups-andemployers-battle-contraception-mandate.html.
31. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012)
(explaining the predicament presented by the contraceptive mandate as applied to
Catholic and Christian organizations).
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dioceses, to general business corporations have commenced lawsuits
challenging the applicability of this mandate to their organizations.32
Despite the wide range of employers represented in these suits, most of
the complaints have taken a similar form.33 In essence, these entities
have asserted that by imposing a contraceptive mandate, the Federal
government is infringing on the religious freedom of the individuals that
comprise the organizations.34 Under both the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the First Amendment, employers have
argued, the mandate places an impermissible burden on their religious
freedom as American citizens.35 Therefore, the mandate ought to be
struck down, and these organizations needn’t comply with its
directives.36
Part I of this Note explains the boundaries of the ACA and the
contraceptive mandate, as well as the legal standards and legislative
history of RFRA and the First Amendment. It introduces five federal
district court decisions that have already addressed the contraception
predicament as applied to for-profit corporations and outlines the claims
raised by these secular companies.37 In light of the increasing amount of
litigation over this particular regulation,38 these five decisions are treated
as the originators of the circuit court split that is developing in the
United States.39 Part II delves into the particularities of the conflict that
32. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); O’Brien v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).. See generally Belmont Abbey College v.
Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25(D.D.C. 2012); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v.
Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
33. See supra note 31.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, Legatus
2012 WL 5359630, Tyndale House Publishers, 2012 WL 5817323, Hobby Lobby
Stores, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278.
38. “The obligation to pay for contraceptive coverage is the current hot topic in
federal litigation.” Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting) (citing Catholic Diocese of Peoria v. Sebelius, No. 12-1276, 2013 WL
74240, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013).
39. At the time of publication of this Note, three circuit courts have considered
appeals from the cases discussed herein and other similar cases. The Eighth Circuit, in
an appeal arising from the O’Brien case discussed in this Note, granted an injunction
pending appeal without any discussion. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
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has developed between these district courts. Part III of this Note
explores whether these companies ought to be granted relief against the
contraceptive mandate and argues that neither RFRA nor the First
Amendment can counteract the application of the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate to these corporations.
I. THE ORIGINS OF RFRA AND THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law.40
Proponents of the ACA have argued that the purpose of the ACA is to
provide universal healthcare to all Americans while lowering the costs
of healthcare nationally.41 To accomplish these ends, the ACA includes
a universal mandate provision,42 as well as a number of implementing
regulations.43
The universal mandate, which was upheld as
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in National
Federation of Businesses v. Sebelius,44 states that with limited
exceptions, all individuals must obtain “minimum essential” medical
insurance coverage or be subject to a monetary penalty.45 The
provisions of the ACA, however, do not list the particulars of what
constitutes minimum essential coverage.46 Consequently, regulators

Servs., No. 12–3357 (8th Cir. filed Nov. 28, 2012) (order granting motion for stay
pending appeal). The Tenth Circuit, considering a similar appeal from the Hobby
Lobby decision, denied the injunction. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No.
12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). And the Seventh Circuit, in
examining two more recent district court cases surrounding secular for-profit
corporations, granted injunctions pending appeal to K & L Contractors and Grote
Industries, albeit with a divided panel of circuit judges. See Korte v. Sebelius, No. 123841, 2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec 28, 2012); Grote, 708 F.3d 850.
40. Douglas A. Bass, Annotation, Validity of the Minimum Essential Medical
Insurance Coverage, or “Individual Mandate,” Provision of § 1501 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 60 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2011).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
44. 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
45. Bass, supra note 40.
46. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012) (demonstrating that at the time of publication of
this Note, minimum essential coverage was not defined).
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have filled in the blanks of which expenses must be covered by an
acceptable healthcare plan by implementing regulations.47
One such set of regulatory fill-ins has tackled the question of what,
exactly, constitutes “minimum essential” coverage for women. Under
Section 300gg-13(a)(4) of the ACA, any acceptable healthcare plan
must provide coverage for women’s preventive care and screenings.48
The statute states that, at a minimum, healthcare plans must cover all
women’s care listed in “comprehensive guidelines” from the HRSA.49
To assemble these guidelines, the HRSA50 commissioned the Institute of
Medicine (“IOM”) to conduct a study to determine which preventive
care services are necessary to women’s health.51 In a report titled
“Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps,” the IOM
recommended that the HRSA mandate coverage of several types of
preventive care.52 As one of many categories of women’s care,53 the
IOM recommended that the HRSA require coverage of “the full range of
Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for
women with reproductive capacity.”54 That recommendation, which
was adopted by the HRSA, 55 is the subject of the conflict in this Note.
Under the ACA, employers with more than fifty employees will be
required to provide “minimum essential” health insurance plans for their
employees.56 The consequence for not doing so is a penalty payment
“equal to the product of the applicable payment amount and the number
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2) (2012) (stating that group health plans must
cover “immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention with respect to the individual involved”); § 300gg-13(a)(3) (stating that
group health plans must cover “with respect to infants, children, and adolescents,
evidence-informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration”).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.
49. Id.
50. The HRSA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). HRSA Home, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/index.html.
51. IOM REPORT, supra note 26, at 1 (2011); see also O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
52. See IOM REPORT, supra note 26, at 8–12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 10.
55. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 (2013).
56. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012).
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of individuals employed by the employer as full time employees”.57
Thus, any company that meets the definition of an “applicable large
employer” under Section 4980H of the ACA 58 will be required to
provide coverage for women’s preventive services, including all FDAapproved oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, sterilization
surgeries, and other methods of birth control.59 If it fails to comply with
these regulations, it will face significant fines.60
The only “large employers” that will not have to comply with this
requirement are those that qualify as a “religious employer” under the
implementing regulation, Section 147.130.61 Under Section 147.30,
there are four qualities that an employer must possess to meet the
definition of a “religious employer.”62 The employer’s purpose must be
to promote “the inculcation of religious values[;]” it must “primarily
employ[] persons who share the religious tenets of the organization,”
“serve[] primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization,” and be a nonprofit organization “as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
Code[.]”63
Otherwise, the organization must abide by this
“contraceptive mandate,” as the regulation has come to be referred to.64
This has led to a predicament for many employers. Because the
definition of “religious employer” is so narrow, there are a number of
organizations that consider themselves religiously affiliated, but are
unable to meet the stringent requirements of the exemption.65 Some of
these organizations are educational institutions such as Wheaten College
and Belmont Abbey College.66 Others are hospitals or dioceses, such as

57.
58.

§ 4980H(a).
§ 4980H(c)(2)(A) defines a “large employer” as “with respect to a calendar
year, an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on
business days during the preceding calendar year.”
59. OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH CONTROL
GUIDE (2012).
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A)–(B) (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
66. Id.
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the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York.67 Still others are forprofit, privately held corporations engaged in secular business
activities.68 What all of these entities have in common, however, is a
religious objection to contraceptives.69 These organizations have
contended that to abide by the ACA would be to violate central tenets of
their religious beliefs.70 Some who believe that use of contraceptives is
morally wrong have argued that “it would be sinful and immoral . . . to
intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support . . .
contraception, or sterilization, through health insurance coverage
[provided by their organization.]”71 Several religiously affiliated
organizations have filed lawsuits seeking injunctions against the federal
government.72
Of particular relevance to this Note, however, are the for-profit
corporations73 engaged in secular business practices that have sought
relief.74 These companies have made two arguments. First, they have
argued that the contraceptive mandate of the ACA constitutes a violation
of their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(hereinafter “RFRA”).75 Second, they have argued that the mandate

67. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542, 2012
WL 6042864 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012).
68. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); O’Brien v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
69. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
70. See supra note 30.
71. Verified Complaint, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo.
2012) (No. 1:12-cv-1123), 2012 WL 1536098 at *2.
72. See Bronner, supra note 30.
73. The term “corporations” is used broadly in this context, as both corporations
and LLC’s have filed suits. Since the legal and tax-related distinctions between the
entities do not change the analysis offered in this Note, the term corporations will be
used to represent both types of entities.
74. Such as the Newland family’s corporation, Hercules Industries Inc., which is
engaged in the “manufacture and distribution of heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (‘HVAC’) products and equipment.” Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1292;
see also O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D.
Mo. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
75. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287; O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, Legatus,
901 F. Supp. 2d 980; Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106
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violates their First Amendment right to religious freedom.76 To date,
more than five federal district courts have heard these claims.77
In one case in Colorado, a district court judge granted an injunction
sought by the Newland family, who own Hercules Industries, Inc., based
on the “sincerely held religious beliefs” of the Newland family and
because the government’s exemption for religious employers
undermined any compelling interest the government could have claimed
in applying the mandate to the plaintiffs.78 In another case brought by
the O’Brien Industrial Holdings Company and its owners, a judge in the
Eastern District of Missouri reached the opposite conclusion, and
dismissed the case.79 That court held that because there was no
substantial burden imposed on the religious exercise of either the
corporation or its owners, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under
RFRA.80
In Legatus v. Sebelius, owners of the Weingartz Supply Company
secured a preliminary injunction from a judge in the Eastern District of
Michigan, although the court noted that the government’s stated
interests may be persuasive, and neither the plaintiffs nor the
government showed “a strong likelihood of success on the merits.”81
Tyndale House Publishers, before a district court in the District of
Columbia, also secured a preliminary injunction, but in its decision, the
court skirted the issue of whether a for-profit corporation could assert
the right to exercise religion under RFRA and the First Amendment.82
Instead, the judge found that the corporation had standing in the case to
assert the free exercise rights of its owners, and the plaintiffs faced
(D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D.
Okla. 2012).
76. Plaintiffs in some of these cases have also asserted a claim under the
Administrative Procedure Act, but the courts that have examined such claims have
generally agreed that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over them. See O’Brien,
894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1154.
77. See sources cited supra note 75. At the time of publication of this Note,
several similar cases are pending in district courts across the nation. Since the cases
discussed herein offer a wide variety of perspectives on this conflict, they will be
addressed as the originators of the conflict.
78. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
79. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1154.
80. Id. at 1169.
81. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
82. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C.
2012).
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“unmistakable” pressure to violate their religious beliefs by covering
contraceptives.83
Finally, in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, an Oklahoma
district court judge stated in no uncertain terms that though the
predicament presented by the case was “‘serious, substantial, difficult,
and doubtful,” for-profit corporations lack constitutional free exercise
rights, and they are clearly not “person[s]” within the meaning of
RFRA.84 Furthermore, the court found that while the meaning of the
term “substantial burden” in the context of a corporate RFRA claim is
“considerably less than crystal clear,” the phrase suggests that the
burden imposed must be more “direct” and “personal” than it is in the
case of the corporation’s owners and their management of large general
business corporations.85
Thus, what has effectively determined the outcomes in each of
these cases is the disposition of the RFRA claims. RFRA, which was
adopted by Congress in 1993, was enacted to restore the compelling
interest test of religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, as set out by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Verner86 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.87 In Employment Division v. Smith,88
the Supreme Court essentially abolished the requirement that
government justify burdens on religious exercise that are imposed by
laws neutral toward religion.89 Whereas under Sherbert and Yoder the
Court required the government to establish it held a compelling interest
in a law that was neutral toward religion, in Smith, the Court abandoned
that requirement.90 The Smith Court held that laws that were not “aimed
at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs” were not subject to
the compelling interest test, and were instead subject to rational basis
review.91 In deciding Smith, the court effectively eviscerated the

83.
84.

Id.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286–88 (W.D.
Okla. 2012).
85. Id. at 1296.
86. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
87. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996); see
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1996).
88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
89. See Topliff, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.

1060

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

framework under which First Amendment cases had been examined for
nearly three decades.92
Congress, responding to the “widespread disbelief and outrage”
that followed Smith, passed RFRA to restore the higher test of
scrutiny.93 RFRA reinstated the compelling interest standard and
provided a claim to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by a law or regulation.94 Although the application of RFRA to
state and local governments was found to be an unconstitutional
assertion of Congressional power over state sovereignty in City of
Boerne v. P.F. Flores,95 the Act remains constitutional as applied to the
federal government.96 Therefore, the standards set out by RFRA’s
provisions have dictated the disposition of these contraception cases.97
To state a successful claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must meet a
number of requirements. The Act provides that “[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless it] (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”98
Consequently, in the aforementioned challenges to the ACA, the
following standards apply. First, the corporation that has brought suit
must establish that it is a “person” under the Act, such that RFRA’s
provisions do in fact protect the religious freedom of the corporation.99
Second, the corporation must establish that the regulation being
challenged imposes a “substantial burden” on its “exercise of
religion.”100 Then, if the corporation is able to establish that “substantial
92. Jonathan Knapp, Note, Making Snow in the Desert: Defining a Substantial
Burden Under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 262 (2009).
93. Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom In Private Lawsuits: Untangling
When RFRA Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 48 (2011).
94. Id.
95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
96. See Topliff, supra note 87.
97. Given that the Supreme Court has lowered the standard of review for similar
claims filed under the First Amendment, see Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), RFRA currently represents the most stringent test that the
federal government must pass in order to justify the application of the contraceptive
mandate to these entities.
98. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2012).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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burden” element, the burden of proof shifts to the government.101 To
save the mandate, the government must demonstrate that the regulation
serves a “compelling government interest,” and that it is the “least
restrictive means” of furthering that interest.102
Courts and legal scholars have offered numerous interpretations for
each of these standards. For example, on the question of whether a
corporation may be considered a “person” under RFRA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United103 may or may not be dispositive. In
that case, the Court held that the government could not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity, which effectively
awarded First Amendment protection to corporate “supercitizens.”104
Yet in light of 1 U.S.C. § 1, which states that “[i]n determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise .
. . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,”105 it is
possible to argue that the context of RFRA cannot possibly include
religious freedom for for-profit businesses, because secular corporations
do not “exercise” religion.106 Consequently, whether a for-profit
corporation can hold enough ‘personhood’ to claim RFRA protection is
unclear.
Similarly, what constitutes a “substantial burden” under RFRA is a
hotly contested question because the demonstration of a “substantial
burden” is often dispositive in a RFRA case.107 The term itself is
facially broad, and might be interpreted to encompass any government
action that creates any obstacle to any exercise of religion;108 however,
Supreme Court jurisprudence may suggest a narrower reading, under
which a plaintiff must demonstrate more than just a remote impediment
to the practice of his or her religion109 and concepts such as “directness”

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus:
Breathing Life Into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 508, 510 (2012).
105. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added).
106. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D.
Okla. 2012) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
108. See generally Zackeree S. Kelin & Kimberly Younce Schooley, Dramatically
Narrowing RFRA’s Definition of “Substantial Burden” in the Ninth Circuit – The
Vestiges of Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association in Navajo
Nation et al. v. United States Forest Service et al., 55 S.D. L. REV. 426 (2010).
109. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
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may be highly relevant.110 Since the legislative history is unclear as to
what constitutes a “substantial burden” there is no clear consensus as to
the appropriate standard.111
As a result, how each judge has interpreted the ambiguous
standards of RFRA has effectively determined whether the corporations
are successful in gaining injunctive relief.112 Perhaps because of this,
the plaintiff corporations have also raised First Amendment objections
to the legality of the ACA’s contraceptive requirement.113 They have
argued that requiring their businesses’ healthcare plans to cover
contraceptives for female employees constitutes a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.114 Given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith, as discussed above, this means that the primary
question in assessing these claims is whether the contraceptive mandate
has “general applicability” and is effectively “neutral” toward
religion.115 If the answer is affirmative, then the law need only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in order to be
upheld.116 If the answer is negative, and the contraceptive mandate is
found to be non-neutral or not generally applicable, then strict scrutiny
applies, which is effectively the same as the test presented by RFRA.117
For these reasons, plaintiffs’ RFRA claims will be more closely
scrutinized than their First Amendment claims.118 Therefore, this Note
will focus on analyzing the application of RFRA standards to these
cases.

110. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761
(7th Cir. 2003).
111. See Knapp, supra note 92, at 280–81.
112. See supra notes 78–85.
113. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149
(E.D. Mo. 2012).
114. See sources cited supra note 75. One plaintiff has also raised objections to the
law under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, see
O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1162–67, but because those clauses exceed the scope of
this topic, this Note will not address them.
115. See id.
116. Id.; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
117. See O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
118. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (W.D.
Okla. 2012) (noting that in comparison to their First Amendment claims, “[p]laintiffs’
claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 present a closer
question.”).
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COURTS OVER HOW TO ASSESS THE
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE AS APPLIED TO SECULAR, FOR-PROFIT
COMPANIES
More than five district courts have navigated the “largely uncharted
waters” of examining claims brought by for-profit corporations
challenging the applicability of the Contraceptive Mandate to their
businesses.119 Part II of this Note discusses the issues these cases raise
regarding how to apply the mandate to for-profit corporations.
Subsection A of this Part addresses whether for-profit corporations
engaged in secular business activities, but owned by religious
individuals, have standing to assert RFRA claims as “person[s]” under
the Act.120 Subsection B explains the issue of how the “substantial
burden” standard should be measured.121 Subsection C describes the
burden corporations must show that the law has on its business.
Subsection D analyzes the issue of governmental interest.
A. PERSONHOOD: IS A CORPORATION A “PERSON” UNDER RFRA?
The question of whether secular, for-profit corporations are able to
state a claim as “person[s]” under RFRA is a novel one.122 For that
reason, several courts addressing the contraceptive mandate simply have
dodged the question by either presuming the corporation has standing
and moving on to the substantial burden analysis123 or by stating that the
corporation can, if nothing else, assert the religious rights of its owners
based on a “pass-through” theory.124 Notwithstanding the difficulties of
addressing this issue, however, one court has undertaken the task of
engineering an analysis.125
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288; see also supra, note 77.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
Id.
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012).
See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149,
1168 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
124. See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, at 115
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)); see
also Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“It appears to
this Court that, although it is first impression for this Circuit, a strong case for standing,
at least on a Stormans pass-through instrumentality theory, is sustainable.”) (citing
Stormans, 586 F.3d 1109).
125. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291–92
(W.D. Okla. 2012).
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Since RFRA does not define the term “person,” one possible test of
corporate personhood is to use the generally applicable statutory
definition of “person” as described above.126 Under 1 U.S.C. § 1, when
a federal statute is silent as to the definition of a person, the interpreter
can assume that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations” “unless the context indicates otherwise.”127 In Hobby
Lobby, when the corporation and its owners argued that the definition
from Section 1 obviously entitled the corporation to standing under
RFRA, Judge Heaton seized upon the conjunctive phrase.128 Citing
Supreme Court precedent, the court found that courts interpreting
Section 1 are free from applying personhood to corporations in
“awkward” cases, including RFRA cases presents just such a case.129
The court explained
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the
actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or
take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the
intention and direction of their individual actors. Religious exercise,
is by its nature, one of those “purely personal” matters . . . which is
130
not the province of a general business corporation.

Therefore, the court held that the context of RFRA indicated that
corporations cannot be considered “person[s]” under the Act.131
Yet this analysis is only one way of examining the issue. For
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United might impact
the analysis.132 Plaintiffs in both Legatus and O’Brien raised the point
that in the wake of the Citizens United decision, corporate personhood
under RFRA should be presumed.133 They argued that if corporations
have the right to free speech under the First Amendment, they must also

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra notes 105–06.
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
Id. (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993)).
Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
Id.
See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149,
1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich.
2012).
133. See id.
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hold the right to religious freedom.134 From the plaintiff’s line of
argumentation, it is reasonable to infer that if they possess the
constitutional right to challenge this law, they should possess the same
right under a statute that was enacted to restore strict scrutiny for laws
impinging on religious freedom. Neither court addressed the impact of
Citizens United on RFRA, but these arguments represent another way to
construe corporate personhood under the Act.135
B. SUBSTANTIALITY: HOW SHOULD THE “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN” BE
MEASURED?
In addition to the conflict regarding the definition of “person,”
courts have disagreed over how to assess whether a burden is
“substantial.”136 As stated above, even the legislators who enacted
RFRA did not agree on the meaning of the phrase “substantial
burden.”137 Therefore, legislative history, which is often used to find a
resolution for ambiguous statutory standards, is an impractical place for
a court to begin its analysis.138 In O’Brien, the court began the inquiry
by looking to “plain meaning.”139 Since the term isn’t defined by RFRA
itself, the court stated that “the plain meaning of ‘substantial’ suggests
that the burden on religious exercise must be more than insignificant or
remote.”140
It then looked to Supreme Court precedent, and
distinguished between the burden in cases like Sherbert v. Verner, and
the burden imposed by the ACA.141 Whereas the plaintiff in Sherbert
was forced to choose between violating the precepts of her religion by
working on Saturday and forfeiting unemployment benefits,142 here, the
contraceptive mandate does not force the plaintiffs to alter their behavior
in a fashion that would directly prevent them from practicing their
religion.143 “Instead, [the] plaintiffs remain free to exercise their
religion, by not using contraceptives and by discouraging employees
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See id.
Compare Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106
(D.D.C. 2012), with O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149.
137. Knapp, supra note 92, at 278.
138. Id.
139. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1158.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1158–59.
143. Id. at 1159.
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from using contraceptives.”144 Therefore, the O’Brien court found that
the burden arose from the outlay of money that “circuitously flows to
support the conduct of other free-exercise-wielding individuals who
hold [different] religious beliefs . . . .”145 And that burden, being
“several degrees removed” from the company and its owners, was
simply too insubstantial to state a claim under RFRA.146
At least one other court has disagreed with this characterization of
the substantiality standard.147 In Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v.
Sebelius, the court read the “substantial burden” measure to encompass
several categories of burdens on religious practice,148 explicitly
declining to adopt the reasoning of the O’Brien court.149 Instead, the
Tyndale court held that as in Wisconsin v. Yoder150—where the state’s
compulsory school-attendance laws on Amish parents under the threat
of criminal sanction substantially burdened the Amish parents’ exercise
of religious—the contraception mandate compels the plaintiffs to defy
the tenets of their religion in order to comply with the law and avoid
sanctions.151 Therefore, the pressure inflicted by this “Hobson’s choice”
is “unmistakable.”152
Furthermore, the Tyndale court took issue with the “degrees of
separation” assessment used by the O’Brien court, as well as its
distinction between financial support and consumption.153 Because
Tyndale Publishers provided direct coverage to Tyndale employees
through a plan by which “‘Tyndale act[ed] as its own insurer,’” one of
the “degrees of separation” discussed by the O’Brien court was not
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1160.
See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C.

2012).
148. The Tyndale court looked to precedent from the D.C. Circuit, and cited
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)), for the proposition that
it must consider “whether the government action puts substantial pressure on [the]
adherent[s] to modify [their] behavior and to violate [their] beliefs.” Tyndale, 904 F.
Supp. 2d at 120–21 (quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
149. See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
150. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
151. Id. at 218
152. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
153. Id. at 123 (citing O’Brien v. Sebelius, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1160–61 (E.D. Mo.
2012) (quotations omitted).
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present.154 Moreover, the plaintiffs in Tyndale did not merely object to
the use of contraceptives.155
Their religious objections also
encompassed “the provision of coverage” for contraceptives.156
Therefore, the court held that since the plaintiffs objected to covering,
and not just using contraceptives, the fact that the use of contraceptives
depended on the independent decisions of third parties was irrelevant.157
And since the court was cautious to avoid “parsing a plaintiff’s religious
beliefs for inconsistency,” the court asserted that it would be an
“impermissible interrogation” of the plaintiffs’ beliefs to insist that the
plaintiffs may only object to providing direct coverage for
contraceptives if they also object to contributing funds to federal
programs that cover contraceptives.158 In light of these factors, the
Tyndale court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a “substantial

154. Id. (quotations omitted). The dissenting opinion in Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d
850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting), disagreed with the Tyndale court’s
analysis. Judge Rovner wrote:
[T]he decision whether to self-fund a health plan rather than to purchase coverage
from an insurance carrier . . . is a decision made by the employer, likely in part or in
whole for economic reasons. One effect of that arrangement, voluntarily undertaken
by the employer, is that it places the employer financially closer to the employee’s
health care choices. Thus, to the extent the self-funded nature of a health plan is a
‘crucial’ factor in determining whether the plan’s mandated coverage of contraceptive
care burdens an employer’s religious liberties . . . one ought to acknowledge that the
self-funding arrangement is one of the employer’s making—and possibly one having
little or nothing to do with the employer’s religious beliefs—rather than the
government’s.

Id. at 863 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the majority of the Seventh Circuit panel
considering the Grote case agreed with the principles expressed in Tyndale and found
that the fact that the health care plan used by Grote Industries was self-insured “actually
strengthen[ed] the equities in favor of granting an injunction pending appeal.” Id. at
854.
155. In Tyndale, the plaintiffs did not object to the use of all contraceptives, only to
the use of “abortifacients and related education and counseling.” 904 F. Supp. 2d at
123. Effectively, this means they objected to intrauterine devices and drugs that might
“cause the demise of an already conceived/fertilized human embryo.” See id. at 120
n.14. The Tyndale court did not assess the scientific validity of these claims, but it is
worth noting that none of the drugs or devices they objected to have been proven to
abort an existing pregnancy. See Pam Belluck & Erik Eckholm, Religious Groups
Equate Some Contraceptives With Abortion N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/health/religious-groups-equate-somecontraceptives-with-abortion.html.
156. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 125.
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burden” under RFRA159 and that they were entitled to a preliminary
injunction.160
In considering the substantial burden question, the Hobby Lobby
court pointed out that no RFRA case from the Supreme Court had
considered the “substantial burden” where the owners of a general
business corporation claim that regulations affecting the company
impose a substantial burden upon them.161 Yet the court still applied
“certain principles” from precedent to find that the degree to which a
government regulation directly affects the religious exercise of an
individual is a significant factor in considering if a substantial burden
exists.162 And because the contraceptive mandate applied only to Hobby
Lobby Stores as a corporate entity, not to its owners in their individual
capacities, the “indirect” and “attenuated” burden was not likely to be
“substantial.”163
There are several disagreements over RFRA’s “substantial burden”
standard.164 First, courts disagree as to how the contraceptive mandate
should be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s compelling interest test
that had been applied before Smith, which RFRA was meant to restore
to prominence.165 Second, they disagree on whether courts may recast
the claimed burden by characterizing the objection to use as more
fundamental than the objection to financial support, or if such linedrawing is impermissible “parsing” of religious convictions.166 Finally,
courts disagree on who must be burdened: in Hobby Lobby, the court
held that the company’s owners were too attenuated to bear any harm
while in Tyndale, the court held that both the company and the owners
could be substantially burdened.167

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 130.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (W.D. Okla.

2012)
162. Id. at 1293–94.
163. Id. at 1294.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
165. See supra notes 141–52.
166. Compare O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d.
1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012), with Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F.
Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012).
167. See supra notes 153–63.
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C. COMPELLING INTEREST AND LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS: CAN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT JUSTIFY THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE?
Regardless of how substantiality is measured, these cases contain
another sphere of ambiguity. As stated above, if the government can
establish that the contraceptive mandate is the “least restrictive means”
of furthering a “compelling” government interest, the mandate must be
upheld, regardless of the burden it imposes;168 however, what constitutes
a compelling interest is inexact, and the way in which a court must
gauge restrictiveness is a point of substantial debate.169 The government
has argued that the mandate advances two well-established federal
interests.170 First, it serves as a regulation of the healthcare market,
which furthers the government’s interest in promoting public health.171
Second, it helps offset inequalities in the costs of healthcare, which
progresses the government’s interest in fostering gender equality.172
Based on the long history of cases validating these contentions, all three
courts that addressed the compelling interest question have accepted
these assertions.173
However, the mere existence of a general
compelling interest does not end the inquiry.174
As noted by the Newland court, there is another dimension to the
compelling interest test.175 In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, the Supreme Court examined whether the federal
government could outlaw the religious use of hallucinogenic tea as part
of a broad interest in preventing the recreational use of hallucinogenic
drugs.176 Finding that the government’s stated concerns were no more
than a “slippery slope” argument, the Court held that “RFRA requires
the [g]overnment to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’-the
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.”177 The Court had to look beyond “broadly

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
See generally Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
See id.
See id. at 130; see also Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 130; Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 992–94,
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297–98 (D. Colo. 2012).
174. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1297–98.
175. Id.
176. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
177. Id. at 431, 435.
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formulated interests” that justify the general applicability of government
mandates, and analyze the potential harm of granting particular
exemptions to particular religious claimants.178 In that case, the Court
held that another exception to the challenged law, which allowed users
of peyote to remain exempt from the regulations, “fatally undermine[d]”
the government’s argument.179
Consequently, in contraceptive cases, courts have emphasized this
precedent.180 Citing Gonzales, the Newland court pointed out that even
assuming a compelling interest is furthered by the mandate, the
“massive exemption” given by the government to religious employers
completely undermines any compelling government interest in applying
the contraceptive mandate to the plaintiffs.181 The Tyndale court also
echoed this sentiment.182 It held that because the plaintiffs in that case
only objected to particular forms of contraception, the government
“[failed] to demonstrate why the plaintiffs in this case must be required
to comply with the entirety of the contraceptive coverage mandate.”183
Furthermore, as emphasized by the Legatus court, the government’s
opposition to exempting these corporations was based on the “slippery
slope” argument that to exempt one secular corporation would open the
floodgates to innumerable other exemptions.184 For all of those reasons,
none of the three courts found the government’s compelling interests
sufficient to meet the RFRA standard.185
However, these decisions disregard a large portion of the Gonzales
analysis.186 Although Gonzales requires the government to apply the
compelling interest to the particular plaintiffs with religious objections,
the Supreme Court did limit its decision.187 The Court explicitly stated,
“there may be instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the

178.
179.
180.

Id. at 431.
Id. at 434.
See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 128
(D.D.C. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993–95 (E.D. Mich. 2012);
Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
181. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
182. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
183. Id.
184. Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 993–95.
185. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
186. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006).
187. See id.
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recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA.”188
Furthermore, the Court recognized that pre-Smith standards differ
substantially from the Gonzales decision, in that they establish that
certain religious exemptions cannot be accommodated without
undermining an entire regulatory scheme.189 Although the Court stated
that the facts of the Gonzales case differentiated it from prior decisions,
it noted that cases like United States v. Lee190 and Sherbert v. Verner191
stand for the proposition that when the “whole point” of a regulatory
scheme is defeated by exceptions, such exceptions cannot be made.192 It
conceded, if granting the religious accommodations would “seriously
compromise” the government’s ability to administer a program, a
government regulation may overcome the necessary scrutiny.193 Thus,
despite the coherence of these contraceptive mandate decisions, it is
questionable whether the Newland, Tyndale, and Legatus courts
properly applied the “compelling interest” standard.194
Although the Tyndale court did not reach the next step in the
analysis—the “least restrictive” question—the Newland and Legatus
courts did.195 Speaking broadly, the Newland court held that even if the
government could demonstrate a compelling interest in applying the
mandate to the plaintiffs, it would also have to establish that there are
“no feasible less-restrictive alternatives” to accomplish the same
compelling interest.196 Since the plaintiffs proposed that the government
simply provide “free birth control” to women as an alternative, and the
government “already provides free contraception to women,” the
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 436.
See id. at 435.
455 U.S. 252 (1982). In this case, a member of the Old Order Amish sued the
federal government for return of social security taxes he paid the Internal Revenue
Service, claiming the imposition of such taxes violated his First Amendment free
exercise rights based on his Amish faith. Id. The Supreme Court held that since “ . . .
the Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and
contribution to social security system is very high,” and “[t]he tax system could not
function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in manner that violates their religious belief,” the imposition of
social security taxes against Lee was constitutional. Id. at 258–60.
191. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
192. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435.
193. Id.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
195. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012); Legatus
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
196. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99.
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government did not affirmatively establish that plaintiff’s proposed
alternative was “impractical . . . “197 In other words, the Newland court
read RFRA as holding a dual requirement.198 The government must
affirmatively prove that its chosen means are the least restrictive, and it
must also disprove all alternative means proposed by the plaintiffs.199
And simply stating that the alternatives were not “plausible” was
inadequate.200
The Legatus court disagreed with this assessment.201 Emphasizing
that what comprises the least restrictive means and how it is ascertained
is ardently debated, the court recognized that requiring the government
to “prove a negative” may be equivalent to requiring it to “do the
impossible.”202 Therefore, the court held that it was a draw.203 It was
“possible, but not strongly so” that the government would be able to
establish that the mandate met the least restrictive means test, such that
the alternatives offered by plaintiffs would not be practical solutions.204
III. “RFRA IS A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD” – GENERAL BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS CANNOT DEFEAT THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE BY
BRANDISHING RFRA AS A WEAPON
Subsection A of Part III explains why cases brought by general
business corporations are inherently distinct from RFRA challenges
brought by other entities, such as dioceses and educational institutions.
Subsection B argues that in the wake of the Citizens United decision,
corporations ought to be considered persons under RFRA, such that they
may assert standing under the Act to challenge the contraceptive
mandate. Subsection C of this Note argues that based on that corporate
identity and the logical interpretations of the “substantial burden” test,
general business corporations are unable to demonstrate that the
contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial enough burden to violate
their RFRA rights.205 Subsection D of this Part then argues that even if
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
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these secular corporations could establish a substantial burden, the
contraceptive mandate, as part of a broader regulatory scheme, is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.
A. THE NATURE OF A CORPORATION
A wide array of organizations has instituted dozens of legal
challenges to the contraceptive mandate.206 Yet, despite the differences
between these organizations, all have advanced similar claims: against
the stringent standards of RFRA, the contraceptive mandate cannot
stand.207 Nevertheless, even with similar religious ideologies and
virtually identical RFRA claims, these cases are not all the same.208
Whereas a religious institution such as the Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of New York may persuasively argue that forcing its organization to
provide coverage for medications and devices it deems sinful is
indisputably a “substantial burden,” general business corporations
cannot convincingly say the same.209
The primary purpose of incorporation is to limit liability.210 A
corporation, in effect, is a government-crafted legal fiction that serves
the purpose of allowing owners of an organization to conduct business
without fear of unlimited liability.211 It enables individuals to earn a

206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). In this case, the government took the position that an injunction
should not be granted to the Archdiocese because the issue was not ripe for judicial
review. The government further argued that it was working to find a solution to this
predicament, and therefore the court should not decide the issue. Despite these
arguments, the court granted the injunction.
210. For a brief discussion on the history of limited liability and corporations, see
Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 152–56 (1992); see also E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936,
50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 28 n.1 (1936); Grote v. Sebelius,, 708 F. 3d 850, 858 (2013)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp.
1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991)) (“[s]o long as the business’s liabilities are not the Grotes’
liabilities – which is the primary and ‘invaluable privilege’ conferred by the corporate
form . . . neither are the business’s expenditures the Grotes’ own expenditures.”).
211. See Presser, supra note 211, at 152–56; see also Grote, 708 F. 3d at 857
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“Although the corporations’ income flows to the Grotes, the
corporate form significantly limits the Grotes’ liability[.]”).
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profit from, for example, the sale of outdoor equipment,212 without
overexposure to legal accountability.213 Based on that principle, a
general business corporation that is engaged in secular, for-profit
commercial activity is inherently distinct from a religious institution
because whereas the latter may exist for a variety of spiritual objectives,
a for-profit corporation exists to earn a profit. In addition, whether a
law substantially burdens the religious freedom of the members of either
organization cannot be evaluated in the same way. Therefore, although
the question of whether the mandate truly imposes a substantial burden
on religious institutions is beyond the scope of this Note, it is
emphatically the case that a corporation cannot argue as persuasively as
religiously affiliated institutions that the contraceptive mandate burdens
its free exercise of religion.214
Furthermore, although it stands outside the scope of RFRA
analysis, the principle stated by the New York Supreme Court in
American Book Company is inarguably logical.215 Once an organization
enters the realm of a particular business enterprise, it is bound by the
rules that govern that activity.216 Consequently, when the religious
individuals who own these corporations set out to gain the governmentcreated benefits of incorporation, they subject themselves to the
government-created regulations that control all corporations.217 Unlike
the dioceses or universities that may advance arguments about the
excessive restrictiveness of the religious employer exemption and
demonstrate that the purpose of their organizations is the inculcation of
religious values, general business corporations cannot say the same.218
No matter how the owners amend the companies’ articles of
212. The plaintiff corporation in Legatus sold “outdoor equipment.” Legatus v.
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
213. See sources cited supra note 210.
214. Nonetheless, some corporations may fall into the space between a religious
institution and a secular business that is geared only toward profit maximization. In her
dissenting opinion in Grote, Judge Rovner emphasized that “there do exist some
corporate entities which are organized expressly to pursue religious ends, and I think it
fair to assume that such entities may have cognizable religious liberties independent of
the people who animate them, even if they are profit-seeking.” Grote, 708 F. 3d at 856.
(Rovner, J., dissenting).
215. See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text; Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ.
Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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incorporation to reflect their religious views, in the final analysis, these
corporations exist to earn a profit.219 If the corporation gains the benefit
of making money while bearing protection from undue liability, it
should have to adhere to the obligations placed upon it by the same
government that facilitated those benefits as long as the government
regulations do not violate any constitutional or statutory rights.
B. ARTIFICIAL CITIZENS UNDER RFRA
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United220 is dispositive on the question of corporate personhood under
RFRA;221 however, a strong argument can be made that based on that
precedent, corporations challenging the contraceptive mandate under
RFRA should be afforded standing. In Citizens United, the Supreme
Court declared that the government may not suppress political speech
simply because the speaker is a corporate entity.222 Because in the past
it had rejected the argument that corporate political speech ought to be
treated differently under the First Amendment since corporations are not
“‘natural persons,’” the Court extended First Amendment free speech
protection to corporations.223
That decision is significant to any corporate RFRA claim. If
corporations, despite the fact that they are not persons in the ordinary
sense of the word, possess the same freedom of speech as do “natural
persons” under the First Amendment, it seems logical that a similar
analysis would apply to the Free Exercise Clause.224 Although it is true
that the generally applicable statutory definition of “person” presented
in 1 U.S.C. § 1 may be ill-suited to the context of RFRA, it is also true
that if the Supreme Court recognized that corporations hold one sort of
First Amendment freedom, the logical corollary is that they possess

219. In Newland, Judge Kane glossed over the fact that the Newland family had
recently changed the articles of incorporation of Hercules, Inc. to include the religious
ideology of its owners in order to bring their lawsuit against the federal government.
See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012).
220. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
223. Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
See generally Sprague & Wells, supra note 104.
224. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435
U.S. at 765).
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others as well.225 Consequently, the precedent set by Citizens United
could reasonably stand as the justification for allowing corporations to
bring lawsuits under RFRA.226
Nonetheless, there are a few weaknesses inherent in this reading of
Citizens United. First and foremost, it would be incorrect to assume that
the right to political speech and the right to the free exercise of one’s
religion are intrinsically the same. While parties often exercise political
speech through the expenditure of funds to pay for advertisements or to
support particular candidates, the free exercise of religion may be
considered a right more suited to the natural individual.227 Given that a
corporation cannot exercise religion in the same fashion as an actual
person does, by attending religious services or receiving religious
sacraments,228 the two First Amendment freedoms might be seen as
fundamentally divergent. Furthermore, just because the Supreme Court
recognized one freedom does not mean courts should presume another
exists as well.
However, the widely accepted reading of Citizens United is that the
decision created a corporate “supercitizen.”229 Disregarding all the
difficulties in finding that a fictional entity has the right to expound its
political views,230 the Court recognized the right of corporations to
engage in political speech.231 Based on that jurisprudence, it seems
logical that the difficulties in declaring free exercise protection for
corporations would not prevent a similar result. Although reasonable
minds may differ on the intentions of the Justices, it appears that the
Court meant to “breathe life” into the corporation, and to empower it
with the same rights as any other individual.232 Consequently, though
the effects of Citizens United on RFRA are uncertain, a strong argument

225.
226.

See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
Meaning, RFRA was enacted to restore pre-Smith standards of free exercise
challenges. See supra notes 88–97 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that if corporations possess a right under the First Amendment, and RFRA was
intended to strengthen that right, corporations would possess the RFRA right as well.
227. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
228. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
229. See Sprague & Wells, supra note 104, at 507–10.
230. Such as the fact that large corporations are made up of hundreds of
shareholders who do not all subscribe to the same viewpoint. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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can be made that corporations ought to be able to assert standing as
“person[s]” under the Act – albeit as artificial ones.233
C. THE INSUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
If corporations may assert standing under RFRA, then the
fundamental question becomes whether they can meet the “substantial
burden” test. An argument advanced by Judge Heaton in Hobby Lobby
is useful to the analysis.234 Although courts have treated corporations as
holding personhood that is similar to that of a physical citizen, there is
something irksome about suggesting that a corporation is able to
exercise religion.235 Given that a corporation can no more “worship”
than it can “observe sacraments,” it is hard to imagine how a corporate
entity can hold a religious objection to the provision or use of
contraceptives.236 In reality, the corporate shareholders bear the
objection.237 However, if the argument is accepted that Citizens United
supports a corporate right to assert standing under RFRA, then the
beliefs of the corporate shareholders are essentially irrelevant.238 In
Citizens United, the Court disregarded the fact that in large corporations,
not all shareholders will agree as to the particulars of a political
position.239 It held that the corporation as an entity, despite its
heterogeneous nature, holds the right to engage in political speech.240
Likewise, in the case of religious freedom, the burden borne by the
individual shareholders is beyond the scope of the substantial burden
inquiry.241 If the “substantial burden” is measured by the logical
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). See generally Citizens United v. Federal
Election Com’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
234. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
235. See id.
236. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (2012).
237. Id.
238. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
239. See Sprague & Wells, supra note 104, at 507; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
240. Sprague & Wells, supra note 104; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364–65.
241. Meaning, the corporate entity and the individual shareholders are indisputably
separate. As pointed out in Grote, [t]he owners of an LLC or corporation, even a
closely-held one, have an obligation to respect the corporate form, on pain of losing the
benefits of that form should they fail to do so . . . The [owners] are not at liberty to treat
the company’s bank accounts as their own; co-mingling personal and corporate funds is
a classic sign that a company owner is disregarding the corporate form and treating the
business as his alter ego . . . To suggest, for purposes of the RFRA, that monies used to
fund the Grote Industries health plan – including, in particular, any monies spent paying
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standard that “substantial” means something more than “insubstantial,”
then the simple question is: does the mandate impose an onerous burden
on the actual corporation?242 Stated differently, will the free exercise of
religion by the corporation be significantly violated by the provision of
birth control coverage?243
To answer this question, it may be necessary to scrutinize the actual
religious ideology at stake. Although a court should not “parse”
religious beliefs, it is nevertheless important to consider the actual
objections.244 These mainly consist of objections to use, objections to
provision of coverage for use, and objections to the provision of
coverage for use of particular contraceptives.245 Moreover, although the
Tyndale court refused to consider the inconsistency presented by a
religious ideology that allows payment of taxes that circuitously flow to
support distribution of contraceptives but objects to payment into a
healthcare plan that will do the same, a court must examine the totality
of the arguments presented.246 It is not an “impermissible interrogation
of religious beliefs” for a court to consider the full context of a religious
argument.247 Instead, it is a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion to
find that if a corporation pays taxes to the government that may
tangentially support the provision of contraceptives, its argument that
abiding by the contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden on
the corporation’s religious freedom is somewhat undermined. By the
same token that an exception to an unbreakable rule undercuts its
inflexibility, the provision of coverage for contraceptives through taxes
weakens a corporation’s claim that providing any coverage that might
support the use of contraceptives violates its religious freedom.248
for employee contraceptive care – ought to be treated as monies from the [owners’]
own pockets would be to make an argument for piercing the corporate veil.” Grote v.
Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 858 (2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). Therefore, to treat the
burden borne by the corporation as identical to the burden borne by its owners would be
to conflate the distinct identities of each party, and would undermine the fundamental
precepts of corporate law.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
243. Id.
244. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part II.
246. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 124–25
(D.D.C. 2012).
247. Id.
248. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (holding that the exemption to the rule undermined the government’s
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The O’Brien court advanced another cogent point.249 Logic and
precedent imply that a “substantial burden” must be sizeable and
arduous.250 “Substantial” essentially means more than insubstantial.251
Thus, if the government were compelling the corporation to directly
violate its “free exercise of religion” by consuming contraceptives, the
burden would clearly be unacceptable;252 however, there is no forced
consumption in this statute.253 Instead, the corporation remains free to
“exercise” religion by discouraging employees and shareholders from
purchasing or consuming contraceptives.254 It remains free to exercise
political speech in opposition to contraceptives or the contraceptive
mandate.255 However, it cannot establish that dispensing funds that may,
after a series of independent actions by doctors, patients, and
pharmacists, lead to the use of contraceptives, imposes a “substantial
burden” on the corporation.256 The existence of independent decisionmakers and the lack of mandated consumption virtually foreclose that
argument from being persuasive.257 If the burden is shouldered by the
corporation, which is the case in this analysis, then there are simply too
many barriers between the outlay of corporate funds and the use of
contraceptives for a company to claim a “substantial burden” under

argument that it held a compelling interest in uniform application of the Controlled
Substances Act).
249. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149,
1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
250. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
252. Id. This point is made in spite of the fact that a company can no more consume
a contraceptive than it can exercise speech. However, given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United, which disregarded the limitations of corporate personhood
as to speech, the fact that a corporation cannot actually consume a medication is
somewhat irrelevant.
253. See O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1159.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. In the first of two Seventh Circuit decisions on this issue, Judge Rovner
noted in her dissent that “[i]n the usual course of events, an employer is not involved in
the delivery of medical care to its employee or even aware (by virtue of physicianpatient privilege and statutory privacy protections) of what medical choices the
employee is making in consultation with her physician . . . neither the company nor its
owners are involved with the decision to use particular services, nor do they write the
checks to pay the providers for those services.” Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012
WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
257. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d, at 1160.
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RFRA.258 For these reasons, even acknowledging that several courts
disagree with this characterization, it is the argument of this Note that
the burden imposed by the contraceptive mandate on general business
corporations engaged in secular commercial activity is too insubstantial
to state a claim under RFRA.259 On these grounds alone, the cases
should be dismissed.260
D. A NARROWER INTEREST AND PROPORTIONATE RESTRICTIVENESS
Yet, even if the corporations could demonstrate that the
contraceptive mandate imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious
freedom, they still should not prevail in their RFRA claims.261
Certainly, Gonzales presents an important principle.262 In a RFRA
claim, the government must apply its asserted compelling interests to the
plaintiffs bringing suit.263 That standard applies to the contraceptive
cases; however, there are meaningful differences between Gonzales and
the instant cases, which suggest that the precedent may not be well
suited for comparison with this category of RFRA challenges. First, the
statutes in each case are categorically unalike.264 In Gonzales, the
plaintiffs contended that the Controlled Substances Act impermissibly
burdened their free exercise of religion by prohibiting consumption of a

258. Id. Furthermore, the fact that the company is not literally being forced to
purchase contraceptives is significant. What these companies are “. . . actually required
to fund is a health insurance plan that covers many medical services, not just
contraception.” Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting). Meaning, “the decision as to what services will be used is left to the
employee and her doctor. To the extent the [company owners] themselves are funding
anything at all—and . . . one must disregard the corporate form to say that they are—
they are paying for a plan that insures a comprehensive range of medical care that will
be used in countless ways by the hundreds of U.S.-based employees participating in the
[company’s] health plan. No individual decision by an employee and her physician—
be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is in any
meaningful sense the Grotes’ decision or action.” Id.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430–31 (2006).
263. Id.
264. See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
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hallucinogenic tea that they used in religious rituals.265 In the
aforementioned cases, plaintiffs are challenging a regulatory mandate
that compels the purchase of healthcare coverage, in violation of their
religious objections to contraceptives.266 Thus, whereas the burden in
Gonzales arose from a prohibition of worship, the burden asserted in the
contraceptive cases arises from the mandatory payment of monetary
support.267 On that distinction alone, the Gonzales precedent may not be
the ideal framework under which to examine the contraceptive
mandate.268
Additionally, the entities claiming RFRA protection in each case
are distinguishable. The Gonzales plaintiffs were members of a small
church congregation that used the hallucinogenic tea, called hoasca, as a
religious sacrament.269 The plaintiffs discussed in the contraceptive
cases, by contrast, are general business corporations.270 In this context,
the difference between religious institutions and for-profit companies is
Whereas the former holds a strong
extremely significant.271
presumption of religious freedom and can make a convincing case that
the prohibition of worship burdens its free exercise rights, the latter
cannot do the same.272 Consequently, the nature of the organization
raising the RFRA claim further distinguishes Gonzales from these
cases.273
Moreover, the stated interests in these cases are not identical.
While in Gonzales, the government sought to establish that it held an
interest in the uniform application of a drug-ban in order to stop the
recreational use of harmful substances,274 in the contraceptive cases, it
has advanced a different “compelling interest.”275 Making a more
moderate argument, the government has asserted that it holds an interest
in advancing gender equality.276 The mandate furthers that interest in

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423.
See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 425.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206–19 and accompanying text.
Id.
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 426.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992 (E.D. Mich. 2012); see also
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 130 (D.D.C. 2012).
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that the regulation will lessen the disparity in healthcare costs between
men and women.277 Thus, when examining this stated “compelling
interest,” Gonzales is almost irrelevant. Because the government’s
interest is framed in terms of advancement and not “uniformity,”
Gonzales lacks yet another point of similarity.278
Furthermore, if the compelling interest is outlined with this modest
terminology, then the exemptions that are given to “religious
employers” do not “completely undermine[ ]” the stated goals of the
regulation.279 Since it is only possible to argue that the exemptions
granted to “religious employers” undermine the compelling interest of
the government if the government claims that its compelling interest is
in the uniform application of the healthcare laws, considering the
advancement of gender equality as a separate compelling interest cures
the quandary discussed in Newland.280 Likewise, applying the interest to
the plaintiffs becomes far more straightforward.281 Simply stated, the
government holds a compelling interest in mandating that the plaintiffs
comply with the regulation because creating an exemption for a general
business corporation would hurt the advancement of gender equality.282
It would add to the number of women who must pay more for healthcare
coverage than men, and thus undermine the ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social aspects of life in the
United States by harming their ability to control their reproductive
lives.283
Admittedly, this stated interest comes very close to sounding like
the “slippery slope,” discussed in Gonzales because it suggests that
granting an exemption to one general business corporation would mean
granting exemptions to others.284 Setting aside the point that this

The government also has asserted a compelling interest in promoting public health. See
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
277. Id.
278. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 421.
279. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012).
280. See id.
281. See infra text accompany notes 282–83.
282. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
283. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (citing
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992)).
284. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
435–36 (2006).
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argument, though slippery, may not be a fallacy,285 there is another
Supreme Court precedent that is more easily compared to the instant
cases than Gonzales.286 In United States v. Lee, a member of the Old
Order Amish brought suit against the federal government, seeking the
return of taxes his business had paid into the social security system.287
Claiming that the outlay of money for social security violated central
tenets of his religion, Lee argued that the imposition of these taxes on
his business violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.288 He contended that as certain Amish individuals
could, his business should qualify for the tax exemption given by the
Internal Revenue Service to Amish persons who are self-employed.289
Although the Court recognized that Lee’s religious objections to
paying social security taxes were sincere, it nonetheless found that the
mandatory participation to which Lee objected was essential to the fiscal
vitality of the social security system.290 Without forced contribution, it
held, the tax system would be unable to function.291 Consequently, the
government had a significant interest in ensuring continuous and
mandatory contributions to the social security system.292
“If
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief,” the

285. Just consider all the cases that have been brought to challenge the contraceptive
mandate in the last few months alone, as outlined by the Beckett Fund. See supra notes
30–31. Furthermore, if these RFRA challenges succeed, employers may be able to
evade many other areas of medical coverage on the basis of religious objection. As
stated by Judge Rovner in Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013)
(Rovner, J., dissenting), “[i]f RFRA entitles the controlling shareholder of a corporation
to exclude coverage for contraceptive care from the company’s health plan on the basis
of his religious beliefs, then . . . [there is] no reason why coverage for any number of
medical services could not also be excluded from a workplace health plan on the same
basis.”
286. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418. In her dissenting opinion in Grote, Judge Rovner
cited to United States v. Lee in order to explain that “[t]he Grotes have voluntarily
elected to engage in a large-scale, secular, for-profit enterprise,” and that the family
therefore must comply with the laws that are “‘binding on others in that activity.’”
Grote, 708 F. 3d at 859 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
287. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252; see also supra note 191.
288. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252
289. Id.
290. Id. at 258.
291. Id. at 260.
292. Id. at 258–59.
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entire tax program could unravel.293 Therefore, Lee could not be
reimbursed for his tax payments.294
The Court took the analysis one step further. To maintain an
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a wide variety of
faiths, the court held, some religious practices must “yield to the
common good.”295 The presence of an exemption for self-employed
Amish individuals did not automatically entitle Lee to an exemption as
well.296 The Court stated:
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as
a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.
Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer
operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the
297
employees.

Although Lee held sincere religious objections to how the
government might spend his tax dollars and despite the fact that
Congress had already granted an exemption to self-employed Amish
individuals, Lee did not qualify for the exemption.298 Because he set out
to operate a commercial enterprise, Lee lost his ability to claim a
religious exemption as a self-employed Amish individual.299 Despite the
small size and arguably insignificant impact of extending the exemption
to his business, granting him an exception from the rule could
reasonably undermine the entire social security tax system.300 The law
withstood Lee’s challenge.301
The common themes between the contraceptive cases and Lee are
therefore extremely clear. Just as the law in Lee mandated the outlay of
tax money to support a government-created “compelling interest,”302 the
contraceptive mandate requires “large employers” to support the
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
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healthcare costs of women by covering minimum preventive services.303
Likewise, the exemptions that are given to religious employers do not
undermine the regulatory scheme of the ACA.304 Instead, they are a
consciously chosen means of accommodating the full extent of religious
objections, while still implementing an effective program. For those
reasons, Lee305 is a far better case than Gonzales306 against which to
measure the “compelling interest[s]” asserted by the contraceptive
mandate.307 In fact, Lee should compel a new outcome.308 The
contraceptive mandate does serve to further a compelling government
interest, regardless of whether that interest is defined as a uniform
regulatory scheme or as the advancement of gender equality.
As a result, the only question that remains is whether the mandate
is the “least restrictive means” to accomplish these compelling
government interests.309 A strong argument can be made that the
contraceptive mandate passes scrutiny.310 In passing RFRA, Congress
sought to restore the pre-Smith compelling interest test for laws that
substantially burden religion.311 It did not intend to make any law that
imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion effectively
null and void.312 Meaning, if the least restrictive standard is read to
include the dual requirements that were advanced by the Newland court,
then the standard requires the government to both prove a negative, and
disprove innumerable vague alternatives.313 It requires the government
to, effectively, “do the impossible.”314 But to accept that interpretation
would be to deem RFRA legislative absurdity. It would mean that
Congress intended to enact impossible criteria that would render the
entire compelling interest test, as a separate clause of a short statute,
basically useless.
Based on established principles of statutory
interpretation, drawing such a conclusion would counteract the purpose

303.
304.
305.
306.

(2006).
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 252.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 252.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
Id.
See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
Knapp, supra note 92, at 262.
See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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of judicial review. Therefore, the interpretation advanced by the
Newland court is illogical, and other courts examining these cases
should not adopt the same standard.315
Instead, it is far more reasonable to read RFRA as setting a
stringent, but still passable standard.316 It is sounder to presume that
under the “least restrictive means” test, government must prove that all
the alternatives advanced by the plaintiffs are either implausible or
undesirable.317 Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to delve
into all the reasons why it is neither feasible nor sensible for the
government to ‘provide free birth control,318 this Note advances the
argument that because the IOM found that coverage for preventive care
for women was an essential component of minimum health coverage for
women in order to “close the gap” in healthcare costs between men and
women,319 the contraceptive mandate can certainly be classified as
meeting the “least restrictive means” standard.320 Stated simply, the
mandate is the “least restrictive means” of furthering the broad interest
of facilitating gender equality because it is only as broad as the actual
gap in healthcare costs.321
CONCLUSION
There are several convincing arguments that suggest the ACA
might be a harmful piece of legislation. It may negatively impact the
quality of healthcare by overregulating costs and thus discourage future
generations from entering the medical field.322 It may act as a blockade
to commercial growth by discouraging businesses from hiring in the
hopes that they can avoid the cost of becoming a “large employer.”323 It
may even be harmful to the culture of our nation if one accepts the

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
Id.
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012).
See IOM REPORT, supra note 26, at 80.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
Id. See generally IOM REPORT, supra note 26.
See generally Sally Pipes, The Ugly Realities of Socialized Medicine Are Not
Going Away, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
sallypipes/2011/12/19/the-ugly-realities-of-socialized-medicine-are-not-going-away-3/.
323. See supra note 38.
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argument that universal healthcare is flagrantly inconsistent with the
American tradition of hard work and self-sufficiency.
In spite of all these pitfalls, however, the ACA is the law. As stated
aptly by Judge Jackson in O’Brien:
RFRA is a shield, not a sword. It protects individuals from
substantial burdens on religious exercise that occur when the
government coerces action one’s religion forbids, or forbids action
one’s religion requires; it is not a means to force one’s religious
324
practices upon others.

Therefore, it is possible that the contraceptive mandate may be one
piece of a broad regulatory scheme that will ultimately hurt
Americans.325 And it is probable that many of the cases in this Note
were initiated based on sincere religious belief, and not just political
motive;326 however, the mere conflict between religious ideology and
government regulation does not justify the imposition of one’s beliefs on
another. Unlike churches and universities, where students at a school or
individuals employed by a congregation knowingly associate with
religious institutions, a business is not a place of worship. Thus,
corporations that exist to earn a profit from commercial activity cannot
use RFRA as a means to stop female employees from using
contraceptives. Just as the government may never force a woman to
consume contraceptives against the creed of her religion, an employer
cannot force its own belief system upon its female employees.
Essentially, the point of this analysis is simple. Christian and
Catholic employers do not possess the right to dictate which drugs their
employees consume, any more than a Jewish University has the right to
control which organizations sublease its property.327 Just as an Amish
individual who chooses to operate a commercial enterprise is obliged to
pay social security taxes because not doing so would be tantamount to
imposing his religion on his employees,328 the owners of general
business corporations are bound by the contraceptive mandate.329 They
324. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, 1159
(E.D. Mo. 2012).
325. See supra notes 322–23 and accompanying text.
326. See generally Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo.
2012).
327. Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (1969);
supra notes 8–20.
328. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); supra notes 287–301.
329.
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must provide coverage for contraceptives because the law states that
they must, and because RFRA cannot relieve them of their obligation.
Therefore, an overarching principle of law dictates this analysis:
“[r]eligious beliefs can be accommodated . . . but there is a point at
which accommodation would ‘radically restrict the operating latitude of
the legislature.’”330 If the plaintiffs of these cases do not want to comply
with this contraceptive mandate, they should not be looking to the
judiciary. Instead, their remedy is to change the law.

“[A] business owner complying with statutes of general application may be compelled
to employ, transact business with, and otherwise provide goods, services, and benefits
to people whose status, beliefs, or conduct are inconsistent with the owner’s religious
beliefs and practices. In evaluating the burden that such requirements impose on a
business owner’s religious liberties, one must distinguish between an owner’s
commercial conduct and his religious beliefs and conduct. Requiring a secular
business over the religious objection of its owner to do something in the commercial
sphere that is required of nearly all such businesses ordinarily does not require the
owner to abandon his religious tenets, to endorse conduct or express an opinion that is
contrary to his religious beliefs, or to modify his private conduct as a religious
observant.”

Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
330. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)).

